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Since the publication of Randal Packard’s White Plague, Black Labor in 1989 which 
examined the control of tuberculosis (TB) in South Africa, the focus of the historical 
scholarship on TB has gradually moved away from Europe and North America. While much 
work has been done in recent years on the history of TB in Latin America,
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 the control and  
treatment of the disease in the British Caribbean has thus far been largely neglected.
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 In July 
2012, funded by a grant from the University of York’s Centre for Chronic Diseases and 
Disorders, I undertook a pilot project on TB in the British Caribbean from the early twentieth 
century until the onset of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 1980s that focused on three parts of 
the region that differed considerably in terms of size, economy and racial make-up: Jamaica, 
Barbados and Trinidad. I spent a week on each island, visiting their national archives and 
libraries and also examining papers relating to TB in the Caribbean in the National Archives 
and the Wellcome Library in London and in the WHO archives in Geneva.  
The pilot exercise revealed that there is plenty of scope for a large-scale research 
project on the history of TB in the British Caribbean that would examine:  the extent to which 
race and ethnicity shaped the research into and the treatment, prevention and control of the 
disease; the financial and other external support that first the colonial and later the 
independent governments received  in their fight against TB; the role played by voluntary and 
professional health workers in the prevention, control and treatment of the disease; the 
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responses of the population to prevention and control campaigns; and the attitude of TB 
patients towards the treatment offered in clinics, hospitals and sanatoria. As part of this 
bigger project, for which I will apply for funding from the Wellcome Trust in 2014-15, I want 
to write a monograph on TB control in Jamaica, the island which has thus far been the subject 
of my research.  This book will trace the development of TB services on the island and more 
specifically, address the question why TB was not, as it was in many other countries, 
universalized as a public health problem.  
The work that I carried out at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) in July 2013 
contributes to this envisioned monograph.  From 1927 till 1942, the Rockefeller Foundation 
(RF)’s International Health Board (IHB) ran a TB commission in Jamaica led by the well-
known TB expert Dr. Eugene Opie and which was under the overall-control of the RF’s  
Dr. Benjamin Washburn. The commission not only carried out research into the 
epidemiology of the disease and examined the efficacy of a vaccine of heated-killed tubercle 
bacilli, but also offered some basic treatment to TB sufferers in TB dispensaries and in a TB 
hospital in Kingston. Opie and other members of the commission regularly published 
findings of their work in such prestigious journals as the American Journal of Epidemiology, 
which along with the annual medical reports for the colony, reports about the IHB’s work 
published in the Gleaner—Jamaica’s biggest-selling newspaper at the time—and verbatim 
reports of Legislative Council debates about TB services on the island, enabled me to gain a 
sense of the workings of the commission and its development over time. Yet these sources 
left many questions unanswered, in particular:  
1. What factors led to the formation of the TB commission in Jamaica and what did 
the Rockefeller Foundation hope to gain from it?  
2. How central were the experiments with the heat-killed tubercle bacilli vaccine to 
the   commission’s work?  
3. What role did race play in the commission’s work?  
4. How successful was the commission in controlling TB in Jamaica?  
5. What was the relationship between the commission and the Jamaican 
government?  
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To answer these questions, I first consulted the RF’s project series on TB in Jamaica, (RF RG 
1.1. series 437T) which proved less useful than expected, because much of this material had 
formed the basis of the journal articles produced by the commission’s staff that I had already 
consulted. More useful, however, was the general project series (437) and the project series 
on health services (437 K), containing Washburn’s correspondence with the home office,  
Dr. Opie, and also with the Director of Medical Services (DMS), as well as memoranda and 
other miscellaneous material produced by other members of the commission.  
This material helped to answer all questions, but in particular questions 1 and 2. Also 
very useful, most notably for question 5, were the staff diaries by Dr. Edward Flahiff and 
Washburn (RF RG 12 boxes 154 and 493), the Benjamin Washburn papers (2A 13) and The 
Reminiscences of Benjamin Earle Washburn (RF RG13 box 12). The least useful for the 
envisioned monograph were the routine reports (RF RG5 IHB/D series 3), which contained 
mostly the statistical data that formed the basis of the published articles. The reports, 
however, did contain many interesting photographs, not just of the TB dispensary and 
hospital and the commission’s staff and patients, but also of the living conditions of the 
people. As such, they are also useful for some of the other projects that I currently work on.    
The RAC material revealed, more than the sources I had already consulted, that it was 
the government of Jamaica that had asked the RF for a commission, rather than vice versa. 
The government wanted the RF, which had already done some work on the island, to provide 
it with a program for the control of TB, which by the late 1920s was one of the main causes 
of death. The RF accepted the invitation largely because it considered Jamaica an ideal place 
to test the TB survey method pioneered by the Henry Phipps Institute in Philadelphia, which 
had started TB work amongst African Americans in 1914, on a much larger scale. Its interest 
was first and foremost research into TB: “The only reason for our entering the field [of TB] at 
all is to bring a scientific point of view to bear on a problem that has been treated too much in 
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the past by rule of thumb and by imitation. We have an opportunity in Jamaica to make a real 
advance in a subject, which has always been most difficult and important.”3  
Yet the commission could not completely ignore treatment as Dr. Opie explained:  
The purpose of the clinic [set up in Kingston in 1928] will be the collection of the 
information about tuberculosis, but evidently some treatment and relief work will be 
necessary to make the clinic function and maintain an interest in it. For actual relief it 
would seem to me the expenditure should be very small and effort should be made to 
make use of any existing agencies, however inadequate they may be.
4
  
 
The home office fully agreed, stressing that by asking existing agencies like the Anti-
Tuberculosis League to pay towards the basic treatment offered  by the clinic, the RF would 
avoid the appearance of “embarking on a tuberculosis control campaign,” which it deemed to 
be the remit—financially and otherwise—of the Jamaican government.5  For the survey, 
which was started in Kingston and gradually rolled out to rural parishes, the commission used 
the reporting mechanisms pioneered by the Phipps Institute. The survey, which soon came to 
rely on X-rays and clinics other than the one set up in Kingston, proceeded so smoothly that 
the RF also adopted it in other parts of the region.  
The other strand of “the scientific point of view” that the RF brought to the TB 
problem in Jamaica was the testing of a vaccine with heat-killed tubercle bacilli. This was 
started in 1931 at a mental hospital.
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 Although highly problematic, because these institutions 
did not have facilities to segregate the inoculated from the non-inoculated members of the 
control groups, results were deemed sufficiently satisfactory to trial the vaccine on a large 
scale. During the last few years of its presence on the island, then, the commission began to 
inoculate members of the general public, starting, as in the case of the survey, with Kingston 
and then gradually moving to rural parishes. The RAC records regarding this latter stage of 
the TB commission’s work, not only revealed the increasing opposition from the government, 
because it wanted the RF to focus on control and treatment, but also the reluctance of the 
population to take part in it. At the time, rumors circulated that it was a ploy by the white race 
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to destroy the black race. Moreover, as the trial, with the vaccine in the general population 
coincided with the formation of the first birth control clinic in the island, it was also asserted 
that it would leave women barren, a myth which the commission’s nurses found hard to 
dispel. The RAC material relating to the trial of the vaccine in the general population has 
raised several new questions for me. In particular, why did the commission continue with the 
trial when it already appeared in the early stages that it was difficult to follow up vaccinated 
cases, because many people moved around or died without being medically certified?  
Similarly, why did it persevere with a vaccine when elsewhere, tests with Bacillus Calmette-
Guerin (BCG) were in a far advanced stages and had shown considerably more positive 
results.     
As my current book-length project examines racial discrimination in Jamaica in the 
era of decolonization, I was particularly interested in any references to race in the reports, 
diaries, letters and other material. With a few exceptions, such as Dr. Joyce Isaacs, who ran 
the TB clinic in Kingston, most of the commission’s doctors were American. In the U.S. all 
shades of black were collapsed into the uniform and inferior category of “negro,” even in the 
North, where there was no formal color bar. In Jamaica on the other hand, distinctions were 
made on the basis of “shade” and there were far more racial mixtures than in the U.S. The 
material reveals various incidents where these two different systems of race clashed. As 
mentioned when the survey started, the forms used were those of the Phipps Institute, largely 
in order to facilitate comparisons between African Americans and African Jamaicans. With 
regards to the color of the participants, however, the forms soon proved problematic. For 
example, Dr. Persis Putnam asked Dr. Opie what color should be given for “an individual 
who is half Chinese,” should it be “light brown” or should perhaps a “separate category” be 
set up for “half Chinese, half Syrian or half something else?”7 For analysis purposes, 
however, the commission gradually focused on four “racial” categories: black, dark brown, 
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light brown, and other. Attempts were made to explore whether the incidence and nature of 
the disease affected these four categories in different ways. By 1934, however, it was 
generally agreed that skin color in itself did not affect the incidence and nature of the disease. 
The binary system of race that white American doctors of the commission had grown 
up with not only shaped their research questions and methodologies, but also their attitudes 
towards the non-white staff of the commission and the subjects of their tests. When they first 
arrived many were skeptical about the non-white nurses and other junior local members of 
the commission. In fact, demands were made at the start by some to employ only white 
nurses on the commission. This, however, was dismissed, not just because of the paucity of 
white nurses on the island—less than two per cent of the population was white—but also 
because black nurses were seen as essential in encouraging the people to participate in the 
survey, since they could enter homes with more ease than the white nurses. Yet, for the more 
senior nursing positions on the commission, white women were appointed, mostly from the 
U.S. or the U.K., a practice in line with what existed in government medical service at the 
time.
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Although many white American doctors on the commission changed their opinion 
about the capabilities of the non-white members of the commission, they remained very 
dismissive of the “black” and “brown” population and at times invoked common racial 
stereotypes, such as black ignorance. But race also played a role in other areas besides the  
interaction between the white American staff and the local non-white staff. Regularly, for 
example, the Director of Medical Services or the head of the TB commission, Dr. Washburn, 
would ask the home office to offer a fellowship to a local doctor or nurse to specialize in TB 
or other work. If skin color was not mentioned in this request, the home office would first try 
to ascertain the skin color of the person in question. If the individual was non-white, it was 
often suggested that he or she should train in the U.K. or only in one of few U.S. hospitals.   
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Was the commission successful in controlling TB? To answer this question would 
require an analysis of the number of cases prior to the arrival of the commission and after its 
departure as well. Yet, as the commission repeatedly stated in its letters to the home office, 
there was an absence of relevant statistics. Even such basic data as the number of people 
there were on the island was lacking. For example, a census was held in 1921, but not in 
1931, due to a lack of funds and the next one was not held until 1943. The material at the 
RAC shows that while the Jamaican population was initially reluctant to participate in the 
survey and attend the clinics, they soon came forward in great numbers. Yet to bring down 
the incidence of the disease was not just dependent on people being tested. It also required 
infected cases to take bed-rest, eat healthy food and in some instances have collapse therapy 
or other surgery as well, which the commission began to offer beginning in 1934. Bringing 
down the incidence of the disease also necessitated the development of places to segregate 
and treat TB sufferers. The financial circumstances of both the people and the government 
did not facilitate this. Washburn’s correspondence and some other material clearly show that 
the government was often unable to meet its pledged contribution to the commission’s work. 
Additionally, monthly reports show that many TB sufferers were unable to take time off from 
work or buy nutritious food and hence died within less than a year of contracting the disease, 
while of course in the meantime they infected others as they lived in cramped conditions due 
to their economic circumstances.     
Considering the main question of the envisioned monograph on TB in Jamaica, I 
hoped that the RAC files would shed more light on the government’s attitude towards the 
commission than the material I had already consulted. The latter had shown that although the 
government had invited the commission, it was reluctant to implement the set of proposals 
drawn up by Opie to control the disease. In 1932 he had suggested that the government 
should first of all build dispensaries to discover cases, second build TB hospitals or add 
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wards to rural hospitals and poor houses to treat advanced cases of TB and train local doctors 
and nurses in the detection and basic treatment of TB, and only as a last step build a 
sanatorium for the long continued treatment of chronic TB cases, because such a building 
would be so costly that it would likely absorb all of the resources available for the prevention 
and control of tuberculosis.  
Not only was the government slow in implementing steps one and two—by the late 
1930s most rural hospitals and poor houses still lacked a TB ward—it especially dismissed 
Opie’s suggestion that a sanatorium should be the last step in a control program. Already in 
the mid-1903s it applied for funds from the Imperial government and set up a local fund to 
raise money for a large-scale sanatorium. This deviation from Opie’s plan caused 
considerable friction between the commission and the government. While existing material 
had already provided me with a great insight into the government’s decision to deviate from 
Opie’s plan and its struggle with the black elected members of the Legislative Council over 
the site for the sanatorium,
9
 the material at the RAC, especially the Washburn papers, shed 
much light on the commission’s opposition to the government’s decision to build a 
sanatorium.   
The RAC documents furthermore highlighted that the government’s opposition to the 
commission increased over time when the commission increasingly began to focus on 
research into the efficacy of the vaccine. This, and also the government’s increasing lack of 
funds, which made it unable to meet its contribution to the commission’s work, facilitated the 
decision to disband the commission in 1942. The material, especially the personal diaries of 
the staff, also revealed a more complex relationship between the DMS and the commission 
than suggested in the material I had already consulted. The latter suggested that the DMS, in 
particular Hallinan, was a major obstacle in the commission’s work. Yet the RAC material 
showed that the commission came into being largely because of the efforts of DMS Basil M. 
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Wilson, and that while DMS Hallinan did not see eye to eye with the commission on the 
sanatorium, he supported many other aspects of its work. In fact, some members of the 
commission, such as Dr. Flahiff, visited Hallinan several times a week and managed to gain 
important concessions from him, such as extending the vaccination program to include 
Jamaicans who were about to migrate to Panama and refugees from war-torn Europe based at 
Gibraltar camp.  
However, the documents consulted at the RAC have not only filled some important 
gaps in my knowledge about the TB commission, it has also extended my awareness of the 
development of public health services in Jamaica. In previous work, I have explored the 
development of maternal and child welfare services.
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 By the early 1940s, most parishes had 
a public health nurse whose work was mainly with mothers and children. This system of 
public health nursing, I have now learned, was an outgrowth of the TB commission. In 1936, 
one of the commission’s nurses was assigned not only to a rural parish to deal mainly with 
TB patients, but also to treat other cases. The aim was to use this nurse—who had no prior 
experience in public health nursing—for six months, and if successful, use it to put pressure 
on the government to set up a public health nursing scheme. While the nurse’s work was very 
positively received in the area by the local health boards, social workers etc. and was 
extended to three other parishes, neither the DMS nor the central government was very 
positive about setting up a public health nursing service. In fact, it took a few more years and 
above-all pressure from local government before central government finally decided to fund 
one public health nurse per parish.    
Central government’s attitude towards the commission’s proposed public health 
nursing scheme hints at a major factor as to why TB was not universalized as a public health 
problem in Jamaica. Central government was biased towards curative medicine. This was 
primarily because most doctors in government service had been trained in curative medicine 
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and also the more general fact that preventive medicine has always played second fiddle to 
curative medicine. The bias however, should also be seen in light of the race relations that 
underpinned the colonial project. Preventive medicine in Jamaica focused on the majority of 
the population, i.e. lower-class and dark-complexioned Jamaicans. Even the African-
Jamaican doctors in government service were keen to distance themselves from this group, 
like so many other middle-class blacks and for similar reasons black politicians were 
generally more inclined to vote sums for new hospitals and more doctors than for rural health 
centers and public health nurses. This general bias towards curative medicine also affected 
TB work on the island, as clearly demonstrated by the fact that the government was more 
concerned to build a massive sanatorium than to implement Dr. Opie’s suggestion that 
doctors and nurses be trained in TB work so that throughout the island, and not just in 
Kingston, there would be medical staff capable of detecting and treating TB. This led Dr. 
Opie to conclude in 1938 that “control of tuberculosis by the government medical service is 
approached from a therapeutic rather than a public health standpoint.”11   
Yet RAC records have also suggested another reason why TB was not universalized 
as a public health problem in Jamaica: the organization and funding of the health services. 
Before their independence in 1962, the Jamaican health service was divided into two separate 
units: a preventive/public health unit and a curative/clinical unit. However, this was at the 
central level; there was also a division between centrally funded/organized health services 
and locally funded/organized health services. Under this system, the main focus in terms of 
money, staffing, and administrative support was on curative services and most of the 
preventive work was done by local health services. During the time of the TB commission, 
the work done by the local health services was paid for mostly by parochial boards. To pay 
for these and other services, they were empowered to levy local rates and taxes and issue 
trade licenses and collect market fees. In 1934, the commission visited nearly all parishes on 
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the island to ascertain what, if any, services were offered with regards to TB. The reports of 
these visits (RF RG 1.1. 437) highlight that because some parishes had a higher income from 
licenses, fees, taxes, etc. than others, they were able to do more for TB sufferers. Some, for 
example, had already set up TB wards in their poor houses before Dr. Opie had made this 
recommendation to the central government, while others had to wait until the late 1930s or 
even early 1940s to erect them, when the central government finally set funds aside for this 
purpose.       
 In conclusion, although the material on the TB commission in Jamaica at the RAC is 
particularly insightful about the methodologies and outcomes of the research that it pursued, 
it has also shed considerable light on two aspects of the commission that I am most interested 
in and which other material is largely silent about: the role of race and the relationship 
between the government and the commission, and more importantly, it has lent more fuel to 
an argument that I have already developed for post-WWII, regarding the  island’s failure to 
universalize TB as a public health problem, namely, that it was due to a bias against 
preventive medicine and the organization and funding of the health services.
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Editor's Note: This research report is presented here with the author’s permission but should not be 
cited or quoted without the author’s consent.  
Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports Online is a periodic publication of the 
Rockefeller Archive Center. Edited by Erwin Levold, Research Reports Online is intended to foster 
the network of scholarship in the history of philanthropy and to highlight the diverse range of 
materials and subjects covered in the collections at the Rockefeller Archive Center. The reports are 
drawn from essays submitted by researchers who have visited the Archive Center, many of whom 
have received grants from the Archive Center to support their research.  
The ideas and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and are not intended to 
represent the Rockefeller Archive Center. 
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